Why Liverpool’s new identity means a little less intensity

In the aftermath of, Jurgen Klopp and Pep Leijnders sat down in a joint table. Liverpool’s chaotic 3-3 draw with BrightonThey were all in agreement at the beginning of October that a major shift was needed.

Liverpool had conceded eight goals in the three previous games. They had managed just 10 points of 21 possible domestically, and had been defeated 4-1 by Napoli in Italy. Champions League.

It was a team that had been threatening to pull off a historic quadruple last year had now become soft-spoken. Confidence levels were low after injuries had caused a lot of damage.

Manager and assistant concluded that the time had come to move away from the tried and trusted 4-3-3 system that had previously served Liverpool so well during Klopp’s reign.

They felt that the 4-4-2 system would make Liverpool smaller and easier to manage, at least for the short-term. It was their goal to return to basics and bring some calm to a busy schedule.

“We wanted to defend differently to what we usually do,” explained Klopp after a routine 2-0 victory over RangersNew setup at Anfield He talked about how they had successfully “closed different gaps” when not in possession.

The double pivot Jordan HendersonThiago at midfield provided additional protection for the back four on that night. It was also noticeable that Trent Alexander-ArnoldYou were not allowed to roam as much. As a result, there wasn’t as much space down that flank to exploit when moves broke down — something opponents had previously targeted.

Klopp could also start the attacking quartet using the system. Luis Diaz, Diogo Jota, Darwin NunezAnd Mohamed Salah. Opponents suddenly had something new to be concerned about.

After leading Real Madrid to Champions League glory in Paris in May, Carlo Ancelotti described Liverpool as “easier to decipher” than the other teams they had beaten en route to the final.

“They have a very clear identity and we could prepare the way we did,” Ancelotti said. “We knew what strategy to take — don’t give them space behind the defence to run into.” His defenders had been instructed to go long in order to negate Liverpool’s high press.

Diogo Jota and Mohamed Salah after Liverpool’s Champions League final defeat (Photo: Alex Gottschalk/DeFodi Images via Getty Images)

Is Liverpool too predictable? Is it possible that the disappointing start of this season was just a sign that opposition had worked them out.

“Teams worked out how you can play against us when we are not at our best,” insisted Klopp. “Other teams have worked out how to play against us for years, but it still didn’t work out for them because we were exceptional in the moment in the things we did. In the moment when you are not exceptional, then it looks like, ‘Ah, now they realise’.

“There’s no system in the world with no weakness. It’s all about how we perform. It’s about what we did and with which intensity we did it and these kinds of things.”

Klopp is correct. It is not the same thing to know how to stop Liverpool. Even Ancelotti and his star-studded lineup had to depend on Thibaut Courois, Paris’s goalkeeper.

The biggest issue for Klopp in the opening months of this season was that his team’s trademark intensity just wasn’t there. Liverpool became more vulnerable as a result.

“For the way we defend, you need to be brave,” Klopp said. “You have to commit to a common plan and that only works if everybody feels the same, and that might have been a little bit the problem. We were not all in the same place in that moment or all in the same confidence levels for doing these kinds of things because we all had different solutions for the same problem.”

Klopp dismissed talk of a hangover from last season, but you can’t ignore both the mental and physical effects of a 63-game campaign that ended in such heartache, especially when it was followed by a shortened pre-season.

A string of injuries had a negative effect on morale. The fact that they conceded the first goal in five out of seven league matches was a worrying sign. Klopp compared confidence levels to “a little flower that had been stamped on” shortly before the change of formation.

Interestingly, the manager also spoke about the need for tactical refreshment to help focus our minds. “We played for quite a time a specific system in a specific way. Once you get used too much to a system, you lose the need for detail. That’s why we had to change a big thing and start thinking new about it as a group,” he said.

Is it working? Liverpool has played six games in all competitions since the switch to 4-4-2. They won four and lost two.

Domestically, they suffered a narrow defeat at Emirates where big decisions were made against them. However, it was followed by a morale-boosting victory over champions Manchester CityA hard-fought win West Ham. Talk of turning the corner was then silenced by last weekend’s miserable defeat to lowly Nottingham Forest.

Liverpool’s tactics in October were more relaxed, less insistent and more reliant upon counter-attacks.

Six games is a small sample and you can’t overlook the fact that two of them were against a Rangers team with glaring problems of their own. There have been some interesting developments.

According to statistics, the number of passes per defensive action (a measure that can quantify aggression and extent of high presses) has been calculated. StatsBomb via FBrefSince playing 4-4-2, our average score has increased from 9.8 to 15.1 games per game. By not going looking for those high regains, there’s been less chance of Liverpool getting caught in behind.

Liverpool’s direct attacks (a proxy of counter-attacking play) has gone from 2.9 to 4.8 per game, although that figure is skewed by how heavily Klopp relied on that approach against Manchester City. Direct attacks conceded per match have dropped from 3.2 down to 2.7.

“It’s actually not a big difference. It’s a change of responsibility slightly and it gave us more stability in different moments,” Klopp said about the benefits of the new system.

“Will we always play like this? It all depends on who is available. We had two more strikers when we began the 4-4-2. It’s about what is best for us and what is the worst for the opponent. That’s what we always did and will do.”

“No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation,” Klopp once said, and his use of an aggressive press has defined his managerial career. “Our identity is our intensity,” as Klopp’s assistant Pep Lijnders put it.

It is therefore worth investigating the reasons for their apparent reduction in pressing and loss of that trademark intensity.

While a change in formation to a more stable, less basketball-like approach appears to be behind the change, Liverpool’s pressing intensity overall has been on a downward trend since last season, which was an issue for a team whose success was largely derived from a high volume of turnovers in possession in the opposition half. These turnovers have not just helped Liverpool in attack but in stifling their opponents’ time on the ball, too.

The chart below, which shows rolling 10-game averages of possessions won by Liverpool in the attacking three, shows that there has been a decline in Liverpool’s ability to do so.

More pressure has then been placed on the defence because Liverpool aren’t squeezing the game as much to suffocate teams high up the pitch. These teams can play through the press and there will be gaps. The high line is one Liverpool tactic that has been revealed.

Pressures in the attacking and middle thirds were both higher last season than they are now. Liverpool pressured the ball an average of 62 times in the middle third. This season, that number is 53.2. Liverpool has recorded 35.7 minutes per 90 minutes on average, which is a drop from last season’s 44.8.

Van Dijk insists Liverpool’s intensity is still present in their play, even though the media isn’t as clear as it was in previous seasons. “With the way we play, we obviously have a start system but you need to have intensity in order to make it work, regardless of what formation you play,” he said yesterday. “I don’t think it has changed much in my position. I don’t think we’ve started dropping off as much as has been spoken about. You have to be aware that they have many players, as you can see from the Man City match. Each game is different and you have to defend differently. The formation is always just the starting position and then it’s about intensity and making sure you win your own battles.”

Although the statistical dropoff in the press and counterpress is real, it’s part of that. As The AthleticHas been reported and will explain further in this article, is due to injuries, but one key player missing from Liverpool’s team, and indeed press, is Sadio Mane, who left to join Bayern Munich during the summer.

Perhaps now we are starting to see the knock-on effects of Mane’s absence, particularly in the work he did for Liverpool off the ball.

Statistics from StatsBomb via FBref show the frequency of Mane’s pressing was less regular, he had more turnovers inside five seconds from his pressures, in essence showing that he knew when to pick his moments.

Mane was a leader of the press at the front. Without him, Liverpool’s ability to control teams has waned.

His work was best displayed in the FA Cup semi final against Manchester City at Wembley. Mane was the most outstanding player on the pitch, scoring his first goal in the 17th minutes by pressing the goalkeeper Zack Steffen into a mistake.

The Senegal international lurched after John Stones’ backpass, which he had pressured him into making.

City couldn’t escape the intense pressure of Liverpool and Mane. Amazingly, Mane’s team-mates and Mane began pressing well before he scored.

Here, he’s getting in front of Fernandinho to block off any potential pass into the midfielder from Nathan AkeLiverpool eventually loses to Liverpool, and Mane is key to the press, harrying Stones in moves that foreshadow the final goal.

He sprints for it when it comes back and is supported by Diaz or Salah again.

Mane makes a few passes at the back and then begins the press that eventually leads to a goal.

Mane scored an identical goal at Wembley in the 2021-22 season. It was a 2-2 draw against Brighton. Premier League. Klopp made a huge claim about the goal by pressing the goalkeeper.

“Sadio’s second goal was my favourite goal in six years at Liverpool because of how we put them under pressure, it was insane,” the manager said of a goal so clearly and perfectly executed in his heavy metal vision.

Liverpool’s style of play was built around pressing. Liverpool are less likely to be attacked in dangerous places because they have fewer possession upfield. Opponents get more. This has led to them having difficulty controlling the game this season.

One player who has been essential to Liverpool’s press is Fabinho. The midfielder has been in a slump this season. It’s interesting that his interceptions per hour have nearly halved from 2.18 last summer to 1.07 this year.

Fabinho was a midfielder who led teammates such as Thiago (2.06) and Jordan Henderson (1.49) in interceptions last year. The slump is significant because it indicates a player having trouble with his own game or the creaking system.

The ability for teams to find and play through gaps has put additional pressure on Liverpool’s trademark high line, which has been exposed by several teams already this season. This is a reminder of the 2020-21 season full of toil.

It’s not something new to see. Alisson, arguably Liverpool’s best player this season, being called upon in one-v-ones. He is often called upon in one-vs-ones more often than not because of his These situations call for dominanceHe saved Liverpool. These scenarios prevented Liverpool from conceding nine Premier League goals last year. John Harrison is goalkeeper.com’s head data scientist.

It was these prevented goals which in part allowed Liverpool to fight it out for the title rather than be in a battle for the top four — which now looks to be the case.

“Only Leeds, Norwich, Watford, Everton, WolvesAnd Newcastle let their goalkeepers face more one-v-ones last season than Liverpool,” Harrison said The AthleticAugust “So while their style does suppress the amount of action their goalkeeper is called into, it does force them to do the majority of their work during one-vs-one situations. Liverpool are unique in this regard — more than half of the situations Liverpool’s goalkeepers had to attempt to save last year were one-on-ones.”

Whatever the formation, you’ve got to have the personnel to make it workAnd the loss of Jota and Diaz to injury has made life more difficult on that front, with greater responsibility on the shoulders of youngsters Fabio Carvalho and Harvey Elliott. Thiago’s absence was felt also at the City Ground, as the midfield was unable to control the game and had little creativity with Fabinho. Curtis Jones.

Klopp, for the second season in a row, has managed with one hand tied behind him, constantly chopping and changing his line-up, with new injuries arising before each game.

Starting with the Community Shield victory over Manchester City in early august, 19 players have missed at minimum one game during a campaign that we are only a third of way through.

Liverpool had Alisson missing that day. Caoimhin Kelleher, Calvin Ramsay, Kostas Tsimikas, Alex Oxlade ChamberlainDiogo Jota.

Since then, Jota, Tsimikas, and Trent Alexander-Arnold have suffered injuries. Joel Matip, Ibrahima Konate(Twice), Andy Robertson and Thiago, Jordan Henderson Naby Keita, Curtis Jones, Arthur Melo, Fabio Carvalho, Roberto FirminoLuis Diaz, Darwin Nunez and most recently Luis Diaz.

This season, only eight Liverpool first-team players were available for every competitive match. Adrian, Nat Phillips, Virgil Van Dijk, Joe Gomez, Fabinho, James MilnerHarvey Elliott and Mohamed Salah

The Athletic has reported in depth on some of the key reasons behind Liverpool’s injury problems and why they are a club where a few injuries presents the danger of a domino effect.Klopp was frustrated by the current situation and said that he is currently in the process to appoint a new club physician.

“For ‘clicking’ you need consistency in the line-up as well, and at the moment we cannot do that,” he said. “Not at all. “Not at all. It starts with injuries. Then, the players without injuries must play too often. The players who have returned from injuries have too many games.

“And they come back and play, and they have another ‘thing’, and the medical department tells you they cannot play more than 20 minutes, they shouldn’t do this, shouldn’t do that, these kind of things. And then you’ve got a Premier League game against a team with a knife in their teeth! That’s tricky. That situation is not sorted overnight.”

The team’s pitch performance has been disjointed. Klopp did not name an unchanged starting 11, for two consecutive matches this season.

Liverpool’s best moments under Klopp have been when they were able to maintain a consistent team and build momentum and rhythm. Klopp was forced to make some changes, while also trying to manage the minutes for the remaining players because of the busy fixture schedule.

These partnerships, which have been so successful for Liverpool over the years, have been broken up. While the right side triangle consisting of Salah, Henderson, and Alexander-Arnold has worked well in the past it has only been able to start together five times since the introduction of the 4-3-3. Elliott, who has mainly filled in for Henderson, is a different type of player and doesn’t offer the same levels of protection, which teams have looked to exploit.

Klopp’s ability to bring out the best on the pitch has been affected by the loss of a few key players. At full-back, for example, when Liverpool have been without Alexander-Arnold and Robertson, there is drop off to Milner, who can’t give Liverpool the kind of attacking impetus, while Tsimikas, who is joint-top of the club’s assist chart this season, is not as secure defensively.

Liverpool’s midfield has suffered the most throughout the campaign. Liverpool has their veteran core of Henderson and Milner; the late twenties trio Fabinho and Oxlade–Chamberlain; and the young trio Jones, Elliott, and Carvalho.

However, they do not have any midfielders between the 22-26 age bracket. This is seen as when midfielders peak and it is a problem.

While nine midfielders should be sufficient to enter the campaign, having two who are as susceptible to injury as Keita and Oxlade–Chamberlain as well as Henderson and Thiago can create problems.

Although there is no doubt that the former three have the potential to be great, they should not be the ones responsible for steering Liverpool to success. James Milner should not be.

Other areas are plagued by misfortune. Longer-term injuries to Luis Diaz (and Diogo Jonta) significantly weaken an Liverpool attack that was originally stocked with five top senior players.

It’s still difficult to strike the right balance offensively. Nunez certainly looks more effective in a 4-4-2, with Jota or Firmino for company. But Salah still loves to go inside those central areas.

“The more the opposition knows about us the better because the more they worry,” Lijnders wrote defiantly in his book Intensity, a diary of last season that was published in August. “Anyway, how do you stop unpredictability? How can you stop flexibility? How can you reduce intensity? We are always evolving. The Liverpool of today isn’t the Liverpool of tomorrow or yesterday.”

Because these key components were missing, it was too easy to stop Liverpool. It was evolution rather than regression. Although 4-3-3 was more stable and solid, 4-4-2 is not a long-term solution. The jury is still out.

Other contributors: Caoimhe O’Neill, Andy Jones, Mark Carey, Ahmed Walid, Liam Tharme

(Top photos: Getty Images. Design: Sam Richardson).