Red Bull Arena, Red Bull Arena. Chelsea’s possession game caught fire.
Sur the right of defense Trevoh ChalobahPlayed a brief pass to Christian Pulisic. The American gave in to pressure and retreated. JorginhoHe directed it towards the halfway mark. It was found there Raheem Sterling.
Sterling was able to draw a Red Bull Salzburg teammate into the Chelsea half. He then laid the ball off. Mateo KovacicThe other was, who made a pass to the right where Kai HavertzIt was in a sea space.
The GermanyInternational advanced into the final third, drawing Bernardo, the last Salzburg defender, before squaring it. Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang.
Rather than dink the ball over the onrushing Philipp Kohn, Aubameyang lashed a low shot into the goalkeeper’s body. The best passing move of Graham Potter’s tenure fizzled out without the ending it deserved.
Chelsea, however, carved Salzburg open for 14 seconds and 12 touch, moving the ball from one penalty area to another. It was like a declaration of stylistic intent.
Was it Potterball? The AthleticFind out.
Formations
Before a joint interview Brentford’s 0-0 draw with Chelsea, Thomas Frank, coach of the home side, was encouraged to ask Potter a question of his choice. He picked a serious one, delivered with a smile: “Why do you keep changing formations all the time?”
“We don’t really see the formation as the end goal,” Potter replied. “We see how the team is playing. The team needs to look consistent regardless of the formation, and then it’s about the personnel — how you want to attack the opponent, how you want to defend the opponent. These are the things we think about. Hopefully, there are things that look the same even though the formation changes.”
Graham Potter gives Chelsea players directions against Aston Villa (Photo by David Davies/PA Images via Getty Images).
Chelsea supporters already know that trying to decipher Potter’s set-up from the graphic tweeted by the club before a match is difficult. It isn’t much easier once play starts, with the formation looking vastly different depending on the phase of play and which team has possession.
This is the way Potter enjoys it. He wants his players to be able and comfortable to switch roles within matches. He is understood to have been pleased with how seamlessly Chelsea’s players have absorbed his instructions, a process made simpler by their recent experiences playing for Thomas Tuchel — another coach who prizes tactical flexibility.
This was clear when Potter coached the Swedish side Ostersund. They went from being a fourth-tier provincial minnow to a European football success tale in seven years. In the beginning, he preferred a 4-4-2 structure with one of his strikers often dropping deeper to create a four-2-2-3-1. In his battle against more conservative opponents, he favoured a 4-4-2 shape with one of the strikers dropping deeper to create a 4-2-3-1. The wingers pushed higher and the full backs made supporting runs from behind.
Potter showed greater variety in his formations towards the end his time in Sweden. He was often using three-atthe-back systems to combat superior opponents like Galatasaray. ArsenalIn the Europa League.
In the short video below for The Coaches’ Voice, Potter gives a detailed explanation of his tactical setup for Ostersund’s 2-0 home win over Galatasaray, arguably his most famous victory.
This video shows why Potter values three-at the-back systems. Brighton and Chelsea: the structural difficulties for opponents attempting to press a three-man defence, the easy transition into a five-man defensive block when required, the ability to stretch opponents across the width and length of the pitch, and the control of the “half-spaces” between the flanks and the middle of the pitch at both ends.
His single season was at Swansea City in 2018-19, Potter’s primary shape was 4-2-3-1. The full-backs were able to be more adventurous because they had two deep-lying central midfielders. Kyle NaughtonHe was often a drifting full-back on his left side, which allowed his team to gain possession in the middle.
Potter’s tactical dexterity was displayed over three years at Brighton. They lined up in a 4-4-2 and a 3-4-3. While these were the most popular starting formations, Potter could often be seen instructing his players to change from a back three or four to the touchline. This was made possible by Dan BurnAnd later Marc CucurellaBeing comfortable in full-backs and wide centre-backs.
There were also bespoke tactics to deal with specific opponents within these systems. Sometimes, the two flank-backs were asked to join the first pressing line, creating a de facto four-man front. With the ball, one of the two strikers might drift out to a flank to create overload possibilities or enable a wing-back to run infield — something seen between Havertz and Sterling on Chelsea’s left side against Salzburg.
Fluidity has always been Potter’s primary objective, but what stylistic elements does he look for?
The principles of play
It is hard to imagine Potter pontificating in a press conference about his “philosophy” or “idea of football”. When he arrived at Chelsea last week, he laid out his vision more clearly.
“I want a tactically flexible, possession-based team,” he said. “Players who are brave, who aren’t afraid to make mistakes, who can get on the ball and show courage and really try to enjoy their football.”
It’s likely that the mere mention of Potterball would prompt an eye-roll from Potter, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t characteristics he consistently looks to implement beyond their tactical arrangement on the pitch.
Sadly for our purposes, public advanced data is scant for Potter’s time at Ostersund. The numbers from Potter’s time at Swansea and Brighton, in particular, show the stylistic details. He had three seasons to shape the team in the way he desired.
In the 2018-19 campaign in south Wales, Potter’s team finished 10th in the Championship while registering the fifth-highest expected goals (xG) in the division according to data from StatsBomb via FBref. The pizza graphic below shows they did it by favouring slow, patient possession football — they ranked last in direct speed (in metres per second) and long pass share per 90 minutes. They were in the bottom half for direct attacks, which are possessions that start in a team’s defensive half and result in a shot or touch inside the opposition box within 15 seconds.
This graphic shows how Potter values possession in defence. His teams love to defend with the ball. They prefer to recycle the ball when they win it back, which lowers the chance of another turnover. Swansea’s possession dominance had a significant role in them conceding the fifth-fewest shots per 90 minutes in the division in 2018-19.
Pressing, however, was not a significant part of Potter’s game plan at Swansea; they allowed an average of 13.5 passes per defensive action (PPDA) — a proxy of pressing intensity — in 2018-19, ranking them 21st among Championship sides. Partly as a result, their field tilt — a metric that shows territorial dominance by measuring the share of possession only in the respective attacking thirds — was also middling.
Pressing became a far more prominent element of Potter’s approach the following season at Brighton; as you can see below, they ranked seventh in the Premier LeaguePPDA.
That didn’t immediately translate into defensive solidity, but by the 2020-21 season, Potter had successfully transformed Brighton into one of the most difficult teams to attack in the Premier League. Their pressing was strong and even though they lost some possession, their ability to slow down the ball allowed them to slightly increase the number shots taken per 90, while drastically decreasing the number shots conceded.
Under Potter, Brighton had the stats of an elite Premier League team. This season, they consolidated their control over matches by pressing harder, putting more effort into pressing, and ranking high in shots taken per 90 minutes and shots lost.
The numbers support the notion that Potter was swiftly transforming Brighton into a team strikingly similar to Tuchel’s Chelsea on a fraction of the budget — an achievement not lost on Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital.
It is still too early in Potter’s reign at Chelsea for the numbers to paint a reliable picture of his impact, but he was appointed to build upon Tuchel’s work rather than rip it up and go in a different direction.
It seems to be working well based on the early data: Chelsea is second in the Premier League division for tackles and touches in the attacking and third in the defensive thirds, respectively, according StatsBomb data via FBref.
The future
The sequence against Salzburg was in some ways atypical of Potter’s style: quick, precise vertical passes through lines, rather than slow, patient possession to cement control, and minimize the risk of opposition attacks.
But it might also indicate one way that Potter’s style will evolve at Chelsea. He has never before coached a team as talented and capable of dominating most opponents and winning matches in many different ways.
Tuchel was unable to create clear scoring chances against low-lying opponents, which was a problem that he never solved at Chelsea. He also failed to frustrate his team. While there were tactical reasons, it was sometimes difficult to see how his high press could be too effective. It seemed that he was unable to generate clear scoring chances against deep-lying opponents, which pounded them back into their low defensive blocks instead of allowing them the chance to show themselves.
The way Salzburg were lulled into a trap in the 32nd minute and cut through was reminiscent of the brand of football that elevated Maurizio Sarri to international renown at Napoli, and which forms part of the style of Potter’s successor at Brighton, Roberto De Zerbi.
It’s too soon to say exactly what form Potterball will assume at Stamford Bridge, but it’s clear he has arrived with all the tactical tools he needs.
(Top photos: Getty Images. Design: Sam Richardson).
